\u201cModal Dependence\u201d by Adam Murray, Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto
\nhttp:\/\/www.adamrmurray.com\/<\/p>\n
DATE: Tuesday, February 16
\nTIME: 15:40-17:30
\nPLACE: G-160<\/p>\n
Abstract:<\/p>\n
It is typically supposed that metaphysical possibility and necessity are the broadest, or most unrestricted, forms of (genuine) possibility and necessity there are. But not all metaphysical necessities are created equal: we should distinguish between merely actual metaphysical necessity, on the one hand, and absolute metaphysical necessity, on the other. In this talk, I explain why this distinction is important, and show how it may be modeled using the resources of two-dimensional modal semantics.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
\u201cModal Dependence\u201d by Adam Murray, Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto http:\/\/www.adamrmurray.com\/ DATE: Tuesday, February 16 TIME: 15:40-17:30 PLACE: G-160 Abstract: It is typically supposed that metaphysical possibility and necessity are the broadest, or most unrestricted, forms of (genuine) possibility and necessity there are. But not all metaphysical necessities are [\u2026] <\/p>\n