Title: The Role of Concepts in Perceptual Objectivity<\/p>\n
By Bill Brewer (King’s College London, Philosophy)<\/p>\n
Date: Thursday, February 12, 2026
\nTime: 1530-1700
\nRoom: Humanities Seminar Room (H-232)<\/p>\n
Abstract: Does our application of concepts in perception have a role in our understanding of the objectivity of what we perceive? I clarify a specific version of this question and present an argument for an affirmative answer: Conceptualism. I develop an objection to the resulting position drawing on Mackie’s discussion in ‘Perception, Mind-Independence, and Berkeley’, offer an alternative Anti-Conceptualist account of perceptual objectivity, and explain where I think the argument for Conceptualism, and also Mackie’s reaction to it, go wrong.<\/p>\n
About the speaker: Bill Brewer is the the Susan Stebbing Professor of Philosophy at King’s College London. His research lies at the intersection of philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and epistemology, with a particular focus on perception. He investigates which accounts of conscious perceptual experience best support a defence of empirical realism. His major books include Perception and Reason (Oxford University Press, 2002) and Perception and Its Objects (Oxford University Press, 2011). His most recent work focuses on the metaphysics of perception and the ontology of ordinary objects. This includes The Nature of Ordinary Objects (Cambridge University Press, 2019, co-edited with J. Cumpa).
\nOrganized by the Department of Philosophy<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Title: The Role of Concepts in Perceptual Objectivity By Bill Brewer (King’s College London, Philosophy) Date: Thursday, February 12, 2026 Time: 1530-1700 Room: Humanities Seminar Room (H-232) Abstract: Does our application of concepts in perception have a role in our understanding of the objectivity of what we perceive? I clarify [\u2026] <\/p>\n