\u201cKant\u2019s Response to Hume in the Second Analogy: A Critique of Buchdahl\u2019s and Friedman\u2019s Accounts\u201d<\/p>\n
By Saniye Vatansever (Yeditepe, Philosophy)<\/p>\n
Date: Wednesday 20th December, 2017
\nTime: 1640-1745
\nPlace: H-232<\/p>\n
Abstract: While commentators mostly agree that in the Second Analogy Kant responds to the \u201cHumean problem,\u201d there is not yet an agreement on exactly which Humean problem he aims to solve. L.W. Beck, Gerd Buchdahl, Graham Bird and Henry Allison, among others, argue that the Second Analogy addresses Hume\u2019s \u201cproblem of causation,\u201d which is a problem concerning the justification of the concept of causation and the Causal Principle. In this paper, I focus particularly on Buchdahl\u2019s interpretation of the Second Analogy, to which I refer as the \u201cmodest reading\u201d because on his reading the Second Analogy has a modest goal of solving only Hume\u2019s problem of causation. In response to Buchdahl\u2019s modest reading,Michael Friedman, among others, argues for the \u201cstrong reading\u201d of the Second Analogy, according to which Kant addresses not only Hume\u2019s problem of causation, but also the problem of induction. The problem of induction is a problem about the validity of inductive inferences and a satisfactory solution to it requires demonstration of the validity of the principle of the uniformity of nature.In contrast with Buchdahl\u2019s and Friedman\u2019s influential readings, which view the Second Analogy as addressing one or the other of the Humean problems, I argue that the Second Analogy achieves more than addressing the problem of causation,and yet falls short of solving the problem of induction. The alternative reading I offer consists of the following three theses (i) contra Buchdahl, the Second Analogy argument proves both the necessity of the Causal Principle and the existence of its particular determinations, i.e., necessary empirical causal laws; (ii) contra Buchdahl and Friedman, empirical laws express two different kinds of necessity that are not reducible to each other; and finally, (iii) contra Friedman,even though the Second Analogy proves the existence of (necessary and strictly universal) empirical laws, it does not establish the uniformity of nature, which in turn means that the Second Analogy argument does not solve Hume\u2019s problem of induction.<\/p>\n
Web: www.phil.bilkent.edu.tr
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\u201cKant\u2019s Response to Hume in the Second Analogy: A Critique of Buchdahl\u2019s and Friedman\u2019s Accounts\u201d By Saniye Vatansever (Yeditepe, Philosophy) Date: Wednesday 20th December, 2017 Time: 1640-1745 Place: H-232 Abstract: While commentators mostly agree that in the Second Analogy Kant responds to the \u201cHumean problem,\u201d there is not yet an [\u2026] <\/p>\n