Title: No empty names, no problem? By Chris Tillman (Manitoba, Philosophy)<\/p>\n
Date: Thursday, May 8, 2025
\nTime: 1530-1700
\nRoom: H232<\/p>\n
Snacks and refreshments will be available.<\/p>\n
Abstract: Puzzles of nonexistence are ancient and philosophically central. In analytic philosophy, these issues are typically examined through the lens of \u201cempty\u201d (i.e., non-referring) names. E.g. if \u2018Vulcan\u2019 is empty, then how can \u2018Vulcan is a planet\u2019 or \u2018Vulcan does not exist\u2019 say anything at all, nonetheless something true? In response, some philosophers have developed views that entail there are no empty names. Can the problems of empty names in particular, and nonexistence more generally, be solved by maintaining there are no empty names? This paper argues no such solution can succeed\u2014even if it were true that there are no empty names, we\u2019re in a position to make new empty names, which allow all of the old problems to be re-introduced. If we want a solution to problems stemming from empty names, we need to look elsewhere; empty names are here to stay.<\/p>\n
About the speaker: Chris Tillman is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Manitoba, Canada. His work focuses on issues in metaphysics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of art. He has published in such venues as Analysis, the British Journal of Aesthetics, and the Journal of Philosophy.<\/p>\n
Event organized by the Department of Philosophy.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Title: No empty names, no problem? By Chris Tillman (Manitoba, Philosophy) Date: Thursday, May 8, 2025 Time: 1530-1700 Room: H232 Snacks and refreshments will be available. Abstract: Puzzles of nonexistence are ancient and philosophically central. In analytic philosophy, these issues are typically examined through the lens of \u201cempty\u201d (i.e., non-referring) [\u2026] <\/p>\n