Title: Skeptical Arguments From Epistemic Possibility<\/p>\n
Speaker: Adam Marushak (South China Normal University, Philosophy)<\/p>\n
Date: Thursday March 6, 2025
\nTime: 15:30-17:00
\nRoom: H232<\/p>\n
Abstract: A classic skeptical argument runs roughly as follows: knowledge is incompatible with the possibility of error, but error is almost always possible, so we know next to nothing. The main replies in the literature are to deny that knowledge is incompatible with the possibility of error, or to embrace contextualism and hold that the skeptic\u2019s argument is sound only in contexts where its conclusion does not conflict with our ordinary claims to knowledge. In this talk, I sketch a new anti-skeptical strategy based on nonclassical logic. On my view, one can grant to the skeptic that it is inconsistent to claim knowledge while allowing for the possibility of error, and one can grant that error is almost always possible. But it does not follow that we lack knowledge. Moreover, I present new data suggesting that this strategy is superior to the existing replies to the skeptic in the literature.<\/p>\n
About the speaker: Dr. Marushuk earned his PhD in philosophy from the University of Pittsburgh, and is currently an Associate Research Fellow at South China Normal University. He specializes in epistemology and the philosophy of language. His current research explores the epistemological significance of nonclassical logic. Dr Marushak\u2019s work has appeared in journals such as Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, the Journal of Philosophy, and the Journal of Philosophical Logic.<\/p>\n
Host department: Philosophy<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Title: Skeptical Arguments From Epistemic Possibility Speaker: Adam Marushak (South China Normal University, Philosophy) Date: Thursday March 6, 2025 Time: 15:30-17:00 Room: H232 Abstract: A classic skeptical argument runs roughly as follows: knowledge is incompatible with the possibility of error, but error is almost always possible, so we know next [\u2026] <\/p>\n