Title: Kant on Mechanistic Explanation and the Metaphysics of Magnitude<\/p>\n
By Aaron Wells (Paderborn, Philosophy)<\/p>\n
Date: Thursday March 31, 2022
\nTime: 1530-1700<\/p>\n
Zoom: go to www.phil.bilkent.edu.tr<\/p>\n
Abstract: For Kant, the possibility of \u201cproper cognition of nature\u201d requires that we try as far as we can to explain all material things, including organisms, in a mechanistic way. Mechanism is widely agreed to involve the explanation of wholes in terms of their parts. However, there is no consensus on how Kant justifies or grounds this important claim. I argue that a key role in justifying the part\u2013whole content of Kant\u2019s claims about mechanism is played by a priori principles which he takes to determine the metaphysics of magnitude. One of these principles is constitutive of the magnitudes of objects of experience, but because of distinctive features of Kant\u2019s idealism, further regulative principles are also required.<\/p>\n
About the speaker: Aaron Wells is a postdoctoral research fellow at the University of Paderborn. He earned a BA from the University of Chicago, and an MA and PhD in philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. His primary research interests are in the history of modern philosophy, especially Du Ch\u00e2telet and Kant.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Title: Kant on Mechanistic Explanation and the Metaphysics of Magnitude By Aaron Wells (Paderborn, Philosophy) Date: Thursday March 31, 2022 Time: 1530-1700 Zoom: go to www.phil.bilkent.edu.tr Abstract: For Kant, the possibility of \u201cproper cognition of nature\u201d requires that we try as far as we can to explain all material things, [\u2026] <\/p>\n