Mindless Beliefs<\/p>\n
By Umut Baysan (Oxford, Philosophy)<\/p>\n
Date: Thursday March 24, 2022
\nTime: 15.30-17.00<\/p>\n
Zoom: go to www.phil.bilkent.edu.tr<\/p>\n
Abstract: If group entities such as companies and organizations could have beliefs and desires, what would that tell us about the nature of beliefs and desires? I argue that it would show that beliefs, desires, and more generally propositional attitudes are not mental states. In a nutshell, the argument is that if propositional attitudes are mental states, then only minded beings could have them; but there are reasons to think that some non-minded beings could bear propositional attitudes. To illustrate this, I appeal to cases of genuine group intentionality. I argue that these are cases in which some group entities bear propositional attitudes, but they are not subjects of mental states. Although propositional attitudes are not mental states, I propose that they are typically co-instantiated with mental states. In an attempt to explain this co-instantiation, I suggest that propositional attitudes of minded beings are typically realized by mental states.
\nAbout the speaker: go to www.umutbaysan.org<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Mindless Beliefs By Umut Baysan (Oxford, Philosophy) Date: Thursday March 24, 2022 Time: 15.30-17.00 Zoom: go to www.phil.bilkent.edu.tr Abstract: If group entities such as companies and organizations could have beliefs and desires, what would that tell us about the nature of beliefs and desires? I argue that it would show [\u2026] <\/p>\n