LAW Seminar: “Jurisprudence Seminar Series: ‘The Duty of Civility and the Idea of a Person’”, Pavlos Eleftheriadis (NYU Abu Dhabi & Mansfield College, University of Oxford), 12:30Noon November 19, 2026 (EN)

Jurisprudence Seminar Series / “The Duty of Civility and the Idea of a Person”

Speaker: Prof Dr Pavlos Eleftheriadis (NYU Abu Dhabi & Mansfield College, University of Oxford)

Date: Thursday, 19 November 2026
Time: 12:30-13:30
Venue: Library Art Gallery

ABOUT THE SERIES
The Jurisprudence Seminar Series at Bilkent University Faculty of Law brings together scholars from around the world to present and discuss original work in legal and political theory, ranging from foundational questions in general jurisprudence to contemporary legal, constitutional and political debates.

ABSTRACT
Legal philosophers seem to agree that what gives law content and structure is a shared commitment to public offices of authority that guide social life by way of general, intelligible and justifiable laws, or ‘the civil condition’. This is the legal order, namely the social arrangement that ensures that persons can share their common life under a public framework of rules, without the need to resort to violence or unilateral imposition. The various philosophical theories describe this shared commitment in different ways. Legal positivism, for example, says that this is just some kind of historical or political fact, the result of a compromise or modus vivendi among conflicting views. Natural law says that it is a manifestation of some kind of objective or natural ‘good’ or an expression of an ideal of justice. These theories come to overlap on the conclusion that ‘the civil condition’ is the result of some kind of consensus about something else, i.e. either the methods of politics or an ideal of the good. My argument will be that the idea of the civil condition is not the result of social consensus. It is the ideal itself. Both legal positivists and natural lawyers misdescribe it. The civil condition is a moral idea that is connected to our practical identity. It is a duty to the self to live as a free person, next to other free persons. The legal order becomes enacted reason for us precisely because we share the moral understanding that a civil condition is a shared goal for all thinking persons. The duty to enter into and to maintain the civil condition is in Immanuel Kant’s terminology a duty of virtue, a duty to adopt an end for your life. The same idea Rawls has called ‘a duty of civility’. In a civil condition we recognise each other’s status as fellow human beings. This is not the same thing as setting up ‘the state’ or ‘government’ or even ‘democracy’ or maintaining a hereditary ‘monarchy’ or even an ’empire’. The civil condition refers to something more basic: institutions that structure human relationships at an everyday level. They are the institutions that tell us that this is our house, this is our family, this person is under your care, this person is now dead, or this is them getting married or that this is your wealth and no other. It would be inaccurate to call these strictly institutions of power, since what they touch is more than power. These institutions are, of course, authoritative, but they also structure our identity and the roles we occupy in social life. What I have in mind as the civil condition is the prevailing mode of horizontal interaction and exchange among equals, where no power need to be threatened or exercised for such roles to be publicly ascertained. The civil condition is an ethical idea that is central to our identity as persons.

BIO
Pavlos Eleftheriadis is a Professor of Legal Studies at NYU Abu Dhabi and Affiliated Professor at NYU School of Law. He teaches and researches in the philosophy of law and in public law. Before joining NYU he was a Professor of Public Law at the University of Oxford. In his book Legal Rights (Oxford University Press, 2008) he offered a theory of legal rights within the framework of an ethical theory of law grounded in justice and legitimacy. He presented a general theory of European Union law as the law of a cosmopolitan union of states in his book A Union Union of Peoples: Europe as a Community of Principle (Oxford University Press, 2020). He is also the co-editor (with Julie Dickson) of the collection of essays The Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law (Oxford University Press, 2012). He remains a Senior Research Fellow at Mansfield College, Oxford.

The seminar will be held in English.
All interested participants are welcome.
Students who attend the event will be awarded GE 250 / 251 points.